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STATUS OF MINING CLAIMS WITHIN THE
NATIONAL RIVERS OF THE UNITED STATES
MINING LAW-MINING CLAIMS ON FEDERALLY OWNED
LAND: The Eighth Circuit held that the establishment of the National
Park system implicitly withdrew the land from mineral entry and
location, thus invalidating plaintiff's mining claims. Brown v. U.S.
Department of Interior 679 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1982).
INTRODUCTION
The Buffalo River in Arkansas was acquired by the United States under
the Buffalo National River Act' on March 1, 1972. The river was given
National River status for the purpose of preserving the undeveloped character of the river for recreational and historical reasons.2
In 1976, 101 mining claims located within the Buffalo National River
area were filed by Mr. Tom Brown's predecessor in interest with the clerk
of Marion County, Arkansas. These claims were conveyed to Mr. Brown,
the plaintiff in this case, that same year. In 1978, the Eastern States Office
of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) informed Mr. Brown that his
claims were null and void. Mr. Brown appealed the BLM's decision to
the Interior Department's administrative court, the Interior Board of Land
Appeals (IBLA). The IBLA affirmed the BLM's decision, finding that
the river was part of the National Park System and was land acquired for
a specific purpose. 3 Therefore, the river was not open to the location of
mining claims, absent specific congressional authorization. Mr. Brown
then filed a complaint for review in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Arkansas.
The District Court used a test suggested by the 9th Circuit in Rawls v.
United States4 as grounds for dismissing Mr. Brown's complaint. The
Rawls court had held that lands which were acquired for a specific purpose
are exempt from mining claims because the lands were acquired by Congress for purposes that would be frustrated by their being subject to
mineral claims. Applying the Rawls test of examining the suitability of
1. Pub. L. No. 92-237, 86 Stat. 44 (1972) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§460m-8 thru 460m-12
(1976)).
2. The Buffalo River is located in north-central Arkansas.
A number of factors gave rise to the elevation in status of the river to a National River. Residential
and commercial development on its banks is minimal, and the river is basically unchanged. There
is a great variety of native flora and fauna, and the river itself has the highest free-leaping waterfall
to be found between the southern Appalachians and the Rockies. The area also contains a number
of sites of archeological value, and has high recreational potential. S. REP. NO. 130. 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1969.
3. Tom Brown, 38 I.B.L.A. 381 (1978).
4. 566 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1978).
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mining claims in light of the purpose of the acquisition, the District Court
determined that although the Buffalo River was not a national park or
monument, the areas involved were acquired for purposes which would
be frustrated if mineral claims were allowed. The District Court, therefore,
dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
Mr. Brown then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. The Appeals Court agreed with the District Court on the result,
but based their decision on the grounds that the establishment of the river
as part of the National Park System implicitly withdrew the land from
mineral entry and location, thus invalidating Mr. Brown's claims. The
Appeals Court did not address the alternative ground relied on by the
District Court that the land was exempt from the location of mining claims
because it was land acquired for a specific purpose, rather than land given
public domain status.5
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
The National Park Service was established in 1916 to promote and
regulate federal areas created for the preservation of scenery, natural and
historic objects, and wildlife ". . . by such means as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." 6 The National Park
Service governs the administration of the National Park System. The
National Park System is defined as including "any area of land and water
now or hereafter administered by the Secretary of the Interior through
the National Park Service for park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes." 7 The Buffalo River was given National
River status in 1972, with the purpose of preserving the river's pristine,
undeveloped character The river is administered by the Department of
Interior under the National Park Service (as are other national rivers and
national lake shores).
The conflict in this case is between the preservation of the river's
pristine, undeveloped character and public accessibility to the land for
mineral location. The conflict is between the Mining Claims Act of 18729
and the Wilderness Act of 1964.1" The Mining Claims Act as amended
5. The classification of land as either public domain or acquired for a specific purpose is critical
as public domain land has been viewed as being open to mineral entry and location. This view was
promulgated statutorally in 1872 with the creation of the Mining Claims Act of 1872. Acquired
lands, on the other hand, do not have the same accessibility to the public. However, the specific
purpose ground required that the land be acquired by Congress.
6. Act of Aug. 25, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-235, 39 Stat. 535.
7. 16 U.S.C. § lc(a) (1976).
8. Pub. L. No. 92-237, 86 Stat. 44 (1972) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 460m-8 thru 460m-13 (1976).
9. Ch. 159, 17 Stat. 91 (1872).
10. Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964).
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states that "Except as otherwise provided," all valuable mineral deposits
in lands belonging to the United States . . . are hereby declared to be
free and open to exploration and purchase."' 2 This promotes the policy
of locating and developing our national resources, and of encouraging
private enterprise in the process. This policy comes into direct conflict
with the policy behind the Wilderness Act.
The ,Wilderness Act has been recognized as an acknowledgement by
Congress of the ". . . necessity of preserving one factor of our natural
environment from the progressive, destructive and hasty inroads of
man ... "' Wilderness is defined by Congress as ". . . an area where
the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man
himself is a visitor who does not remain." 4 A wilderness area is to retain
a primeval character, devoid of premanent improvements or human habitation, and may also contain other features of scientific, educational,
scenic or historic value. Wilderness classification is the greatest degree
of protection from mineral entry and location that Congress can give to
an area."' Accordingly, mineral location and exploration practices are
more severely restricted in areas administered by the National Park System
and designated as wilderness, as compared to National Forest land. The
National Forest lands are administered by the Office of the Secretary of
Agriculture, which follows a multiple-use policy which makes for greater
access to minerals.
One problem the Court of Appeals addressed in this case was whether
a river which is declared a National River becomes a part of the National
Park System, thereby coming under the umbrella of the more severe
mining restrictions provided by that system. Mr. Brown argued that because the river is not a national park or a national monument, it is not
11. In 1920 Congress passed a law implementing a permit/leasing system of disposal for specified
minerals on public land. As amended, the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, ch. 85 § 1, 41 Stat. 437
(1920) provides that "deposits of coal, phosphate, sodium, potassium, oil, oil shale, native asphalt,
solid and semi-solid bitumen, and bitumenous rock ... and lands containing such deposits owned
by the United States ... shall be subject to disposition in the form and manner provided by this
act . . ." 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1976). Therefore, the minerals enumerated in the Mineral Leasing Act
are no longer subject to disposal by location under the General Mining Law. Since the General
Mining Law was no longer the exclusive statutory method of disposing of minerals on public lands
after 1920, the words "except as otherwise provided" were added to the section of the United States
Code now containing Section One of the 1872 statute 30 U.S.C. §22 (1976).
12. 17 Stat. 91 § 1 (1872) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1976)). The Act was criticized
in Cox, FederalMineral Policy: The General Mining Law of 1872, 17 NAT. RES. J. 601 (1976).
13. Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 793, 795 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989
(1972).
14. 78 Stat. 890, 891 (1964).
15. The Wilderness Act does extend mining laws applicable to national forest lands designated
as wilderness areas, as administered by the Secretary of Agriculture, (until December 31, 1983).
Such activies, however, must be carried out in a manner compatible with the preservation of the
wilderness environment. 78 Stat. 890, 894 §4(d), (1964).
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to be considered a part of the National Park System. In support of his
argument, Mr. Brown relied on the Mining Claims Act and the Wilderness
Act. He claimed that the language of the Mining Claims Act implies that
an express statement excluding public lands from mineral exploration is
required in any congressional act setting aside land as a National River.' 6
No such statement exists in the statutory language establishing the Buffalo
National River. That statute does require, however, that the river be
reviewed for suitability as a national wilderness area, as required by
subsection 3(c) and 3(d) of the Wilderness Act.' 7 Mr. Brown argued that
since the Wilderness Act does not affect withdrawal of mineral exploration
until 1983, claims may be asserted in wilderness areas before that date.'"
ANALYSIS
The significance of the court's holding in Brown lies in the court's
interpretation of the scope of the National Park System and the National
Park Service, and the court's reliance on the legislative history of the
Mining Activities Within the National Park System Area Act."' Section
1(c)(a) of the National Park Services Act defines the national park system.2" This definition includes any area administered by the Secretary of
the Interior for historic or recreational purposes. An examination of the
statute creating the Buffalo National River reveals that the Secretary of
the Interior is charged with administration of the river under the National
Park Services Act, 2' "[f]or the purposes of conserving and interpreting an
area containing unique scenic and scientific features, and preserving as
a free-flowing stream an important segment of the Buffalo River in Arkansas for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations." 2 2
The legislative history of the Act also indicates that Congress intended
to acquire land for historical and recreational purposes. 3
The Mining Activities Within the National Park Systems Areas Act
repealed the provisions of six organic acts allowing mining claims within
16. The Act states that "all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States are
hereby declared to be free and open to exploration and purchase . . ." 17 Stat. 91 (1872).
17. The Secretary of the Interior "shall review every roadless area . . .under his jurisdiction
... as to the suitability or non-suitability of each such area . . . for preservation as wilderness."
Both the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture are also required to provide public notice and
hearings before they recommend an area for preservation. 78 Stat. 890, 891-893 (1964).
18. See, supra note 16.
19. Pub. L. No. 94-429, 90 Stat. 1342 (1976).
20. 16 U.S.C. § l(c)(a) (1976) states: "The 'national park system' shall include any area of land
and water now or hereafter administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the National Park
Service for park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes."
21. 16 U.S.C. §460m-12 (1976).
22. 16 U.S.C. §460m-8 (1976).
23. S. REP. NO. 130, supra note 2.
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the national park system areas.24 The legislative history of the Act points
out that not one of the more than 100 new additions to the System since
the 1950s was established subject to mineral entry. Also, the few areas
which were classified as open to mineral entry required specific legislation
to that effect.2s
The court determined that the Buffalo River was within the National
Park System and, therefore, entitled to protection designed to leave the
area unimpaired for future generations. This purpose, said the court,
implies that mineral entry and exploration is not allowed. Mr. Brown's
argument regarding the potential wilderness status of the river and the
possibility of asserting claims in wilderness areas before December 31,
1983, was quickly disposed of by the court. The National Wilderness
Preservation System Act states that the right to mineral entry is preserved
in national forest lands administered by the Secretary of Agriculture.26
The court determined that the Buffalo River was not national forest land
and was not administered by the Secretary of Agriculture. Therefore, the
provision allowing mineral entry and location in wilderness areas did not
apply to the Buffalo River.
The court disposed of Mr. Brown's Mining Claims Act argument in
the Court relied on Oklahoma
the same summary fashion. In doing so,
29
28
v. Texas,27 Thompson v. United States, and Rawson v. United States.
Oklahoma v. Texas concerned a controversy over title to the south half
of the riverbed of the Red River. The Red River is the boundary between
Oklahoma and Texas and also happens to have oil-rich sections. The issue
in that case was whether the oil-rich section of the riverbed was subject
to location and acquisition under the mining laws. The claimants wishing
to undertake mineral exploration relied on statutory language which stated
that all mineral deposits on U.S.-owned land were open for exploration
and purchase. 3" The Supreme Court of the United States in Oklahoma v.
Texas responded that when the section relied on by the claimants was
read with due regard for the entire statute, ". . . it is apparent that, while
embracing only lands owned by the United States, it does not embrace
all that are so owned."'" The Supreme Court held that the Mining Claims
24. Pub. L. No. 94-429, §2, 90 Stat. 1342 (1976).
25. H. REP. NO. 1428, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2487, 2489, 2493.
26. Pub. L. No. 88-577, § 3, 78 Stat. 890, 893 (1964) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1976).
.. the United States mining laws ... shall ... extend to those national forest lands designated
by this Act as 'wilderness areas'; subject, however, to such reasonable regulations governing ingress
and egress as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture ..
27. 258 U.S. 574 (1921).
28. 308 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1962).
29. 225 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1955).

30. 17 Stat. 91 (1872).
31. 258 U.S. at 600.
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Act applied only to public lands held for disposal under specific laws.
The Act never applied where the government directed disposal of land
under other laws such as the homestead and townsite laws.32 As the
riverbed was not land held for disposal under the land laws, it was not
subject to acquisition under the mining laws.
The issue in Rawson v. United States" was whether land purchased by
the United States for a specific purpose was open to exploration under
the general mining laws. Prior to mineral location, the government purchased the land in question for the purpose of retiring submarginal land
from agricultural use, preventing soil erosion, protecting watersheds, and
conserving wildlife. The Rawson court held that mineral entry may be
made only on public lands subject to entry, sale, or other disposal pursuant
to general law and that "patent lands reacquired by the United States are
not by mere force of the reacquisition restored to public domain." 3 4 As
such, the Rawson court said that the land was not subject to mineral entry
because it was not part of the public domain and because it was land
acquired for a specific purpose. In the language of the court, the land
was an area ". . . which it could not rationally be argued remain open
to location and exploration under the mineral laws," an area similar to
"parks, national monuments and the like." 3 5
The land in Thompson v. United States36 was acquired by the government as a donation for the specific purpose of encouraging forestry practices for the benefit of the general public. The Thompson court found that
this was land acquired for a specific purpose, and was not land which
was part of the original public domain. The court, therefore, held that
recognition of mining claims would be wholly inconsistent with the purpose of the acquisition.
All three cases involved land acquired by the government for specific
puposes which remove it from mineral entry, absent contrary legislation.
37 however,
The Eighth Circuit in Brown v. U.S. Department of Interior,
decided not to address the "specific purpose" doctrine and its possible
application to this case. The land in this case was acquired by the government for the specific purpose of preserving its "pristine character,"
among other reasons. Presumably mining would frustrate this specific
purpose. It is because of the "specific purpose" that the District Court
held for the Department of the Interior. To hold otherwise and allow
32. The part of the riverbed in question was made part of the territory of Oklahoma in 1890.
Congress at this time had indicated that the land in that territory be disposed of only under the
homestead and townsite laws. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, 26 Stat. 81 (1890). These laws provided
for the transfer of acreage for the establishment of a homestead (after 5 years) or a townsite.
33. 225 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1955).
34. Id. at 858.
35. Id.
36. 308 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1962).
37. 679 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1982).
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mineral entry would frustrate congressional intent to preserve the undeveloped character of the Buffalo River.
The Appeals Court, however, based its analysis not on the "specific
purpose" doctrine but on a construction of congressional intent, using
the National Park System/National Park Service approach. This approach
uses two prongs: 1) Is the land within the scope of the National Park
Service? and 2) Has mineral entry been affirmatively granted? This test
is inferred from the fact that when Congress has desired to make lands
open to mineral entry, it specifically so states in the establishing act or
through a separate specific act of Congress.38 The Eighth Circuit Court
held then that Mr. Brown's claims were invalid because the Buffalo River
is part of the National Park System and the act creating the Buffalo River
did not specifically open the river for mineral exploration.
CONCLUSION
The Appellate Court reached its result based on proper statutory interpretation. However, the court refused the opportunity to expand on the
"specific purpose" doctrine. At worst, the court's refusal to apply the
specific purpose doctrine can be viewed as a rejection of the doctrine as
the higher court chose to agree with the District Court in the result, but
disagreed with the District Court on the best path to that result. Under
these circumstances, the 8th Circuit opinion may be viewed as confusing
the issue of future mineral exploration within the National Park System.
This confusion may weaken the usefulness of the doctrine as a powerful
legislative and judicial tool.39
Increased reliance on non-renewable resources, be it for aesthetic value
or economic gain, stresses the importance of an orderly progression in
policy concerning mineral exploration within our national parks and wilderness areas. This case provided an excellent opportunity for the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals to further that policy. Whether the court has
advanced that policy or simply muddied the waters remains to be seen.
DANIEL VIRAMONTES
38. The court concluded that when Congress has desired to make lands within an area of the
National Park System open to mineral entry, the establishing act specifically so states. Id. at 750.
See 16 U.S.C. §94 (1976) (Mount Rainer National Park); 16 U.S.C. § 127 (1976) (crater Lake
National Park); 16 U.S.C. § 252 (1976) (Olympic National Park; and 16 U.S.C. § 350(a) (repealed
1976) (Mount Kinley National Park). Also, the National Park Systems Areas Act. Pub. L. No. 94429, § 2, 90 Stat. 1342 (1976) repealed the provisions of six organic acts allowing mining claims
in National Park Systems areas.
39. The Court of Appeals also had the opportunity to clarify the policy differences between the
Department of Interior and the Department of Agriculture regarding land use. This "missed opportunity" is more understandable, however, as once the Appeals Court had determined that the Buffalo
River was part of the National Park System, it is arguable whether there was any need for the court
to examine any policy inconsistencies between the two departments.

